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Local Agency in Development, Market, and Forest  
Conservation Interventions in Lao PDR’s Northern Uplands
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and Moira Moeliono††
Themes of inclusion, empowerment, and participation are recurrent in development 
discourse and interventions, implying enablement of agency on the part of com-
munities and individuals to inform and influence how policies that affect them are 
enacted.  This article aims to contribute to debates on participation in rural develop-
ment and environmental conservation, by applying a structure-agency lens to 
examine experiences of marginal farm households in three distinct systems of 
resource allocation in Lao PDR’s northern uplands—in other words, three institu-
tional or (in)formal structures.  These comprise livelihood development and poverty 
reduction projects, maize contract farming, and a national protected area.  Drawing 
on qualitative data from focus group discussions and household surveys, the article 
explores the degree to which farmers may shape their engagement with the differ-
ent systems, and ways in which agency may be enabled or disabled by this engage-
ment.  Our findings show that although some development interventions provide 
consultative channels for expressing needs, these are often within limited options 
set from afar.  The market-based maize system, while in some ways agency-enabling, 
also entailed narrow choices and heavy dependence on external actors.  The direct 
regulation of the protected area system meanwhile risked separating policy deci-
sions from existing local knowledge.  Our analytical approach moves beyond notions 
of agency commonly focused on decision-making and/or resistance, and instead 
revisits the structure-agency dichotomy to build a nuanced understanding of  people’s 
lived experiences of interventions.  This allows for fresh perspectives on the every-
day enablement or disablement of agency, aiming to support policy that is better 
grounded in local realities.
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I Introduction
To be an agent means to be capable of exerting some degree of control over the social relations in 
which one is enmeshed, which in turn implies the ability to transform those social relations to some 
degree. (Sewell 1992, 20)
The structure-agency dichotomy is a deep-rooted theme across most disciplines of 
the social sciences, depicting “the tension between individual freedom and social con-
straint” (Rigg 2007, 24).  Though much theoretical debate in this vein functions at some 
degree of abstraction, agency is fundamental to more immediate discourse surrounding 
inclusion, empowerment, and participation—terms that have proliferated over several 
decades in relation to bottom-up approaches to development, and more recently in natu-
ral resource governance (Parkins and Mitchell 2005), to the point of becoming “institu-
tional imperatives” (Agarwal 2001).  Local participation in projects is “argued to exert a 
strong impact on development outcomes,” often associated with perceived positive 
impacts of empowerment on governance, inclusive policies, and equitable access to 
markets, though these claims are not always empirically substantiated (Ibrahim and 
Alkire 2007, 395).  A key focus of participatory or empowering development approaches 
is “inclusion in decision making of those most affected by the proposed intervention,” 
with effective participation sometimes considered on a collective rather than an indi-
vidual basis (Agarwal 2001, 1623).  One example of this is the widespread policy trend 
toward participatory or community- based forest management in developing countries 
(Islam et al. 2015), implying “a designation of power over forest resources to local people 
. . . to decide how their forests will be managed and for what purposes” (Tole 2010, 1312). 
While both support for and skepticism toward community-based forest management have 
emerged over recent decades, there is mounting evidence that participation of communi-
ties and benefits to local livelihoods are “more likely to contribute to conservation effec-
tiveness than conservation without local participation” (Martin et al. 2018, 93).
Contradictions nevertheless arise where external actors attempt to impose ideals 
of participation and inclusion, whose realization rests on the extent that expression of 
agency is constrained by entrenched social structures (Sesan 2014).  Even where legal 
mandates for public participation are in place, it is often the case in environment-related 
interventions that those with crucial local knowledge are limited in their ability to con-
tribute to policy design by the nature of institutional procedures (Simmons 2007, 136). 
Understanding these dynamics is arguably central to idealized inclusive development in 
general, as well as more effective and equitable forest policies, in which agency is often 
entangled in local-level power relations and differentiated access to resources and infor-
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mation (Brockhaus et al. 2014a; Gallemore et al. 2014; Kallio et al. 2016).  “Inclusion” in 
such processes therefore implies the enablement of agency on the part of forest-dwelling 
communities to inform and influence how the policies and measures that affect them are 
shaped at different levels.
With this said, agency can often appear as something of a forgotten predecessor to 
participatory and inclusive notions of development, and is more commonly associated 
with decision-making in applied research or resistance in Marxian-influenced scholarship 
in agrarian contexts.  In the research presented here, we seek to contribute to debates 
on participation in rural development and environmental conservation by returning to 
the structure-agency dichotomy that underpins these concepts, and assembling a nuanced 
understanding of people’s lived experiences of different forms of intervention.  We argue 
that analysis of individual agency in response to social constraints remains highly relevant 
to understanding how such interventions are experienced, negotiated, adopted, or indeed 
rejected by those affected, particularly with respect to those interventions which aim to 
be participatory or inclusive.
The sections that follow apply a structure-agency lens to examine experiences of 
marginal farm households in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic’s (Lao PDR, or Laos) 
northern uplands in three distinct systems of resource allocation—in other words, three 
institutional or (in)formal structures.  We apply this lens to consider: i) the degree to 
which farmers may shape their engagement with the different systems; and ii) the ways 
in which agency may be enabled or disabled by this engagement.  We explore these 
questions using qualitative data from focus group discussions and household surveys 
conducted in two villages of Xone district, Houaphan province (see Fig. 1, Section III-2), 
which although geographically remote, are far from isolated from the influence of 
mainstream development practices, state policies, and market integration.  The three 
examined systems are: i) livelihood development and poverty reduction projects;1) 
ii) a market-based structure for maize contract farming; and iii) direct state regulation 
under a national protected area.  The article proceeds as follows: Section II explores 
relevant theoretical applications on the theme of structure-agency in agrarian and devel-
oping contexts, and how a structure-agency lens might be applied with the regards to 
policies and interventions affecting forest communities.  Section III describes the study 
context in further detail, the field sites, and methods employed.  Sections IV and V ana-
lyze and discuss the results of the focus group discussions and household surveys. 
Section VI concludes with reflections on the application of a structure-agency approach 
1) This description is unavoidably broad owing to the volume of projects that have been undertaken 
in the area, and respondents tended not to strongly differentiate projects, organizations, or their 
purposes.
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in con sidering realities for ideals of inclusion and participation, and implications for 
enabling more direct involvement by marginal households in influencing the policies and 
interventions that affect them.
II Structures as Systems of Resource Allocation
Individual-society relations are fundamental to the theoretical and philosophical under-
pinnings of social science (Thompson 1989), forming the basis of thought in relation to 
the capacity of people to influence the circumstances of their existence (Emirbayer and 
Mische 1998).  The common contrasting elements of the structure-agency tension are 
that, through the exercise of agency, individuals or groups may “act independently of and 
in opposition to structural constraints, and/or may (re)constitute social structures through 
their freely chosen actions,” while lack of agency implies passive adherence to structural 
constraints, and inability to choose otherwise (Loyal and Barnes 2001, 507).  Viewing the 
social world from the perspective of agency prioritizes the extent of control individuals 
have over their lives (thereby assuming decision-making power), while the opposing 
perspective prioritizes structural factors that narrow individual choice (Rigg 2007). 
 Giddens’ formative account, The Constitution of Society, conceptualizes structure as “rules 
and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems” (1984, 377), 
by which “structures shape people’s practices, but it is also people’s practices that 
 constitute (and reproduce) structures” (Sewell 1992, 5).  Sewell expands on Giddens’ 
framing to focus on the nature of the resource allocation function of social structures, 
arguing that structure “always derives from the character and distribution of resources 
in the everyday world” (ibid., 27), with agency as the means of both its maintenance and 
transformation.
II-1 Agency and Agrarian Change
In agrarian societies, as wide expanses of rural Laos continue to be, agency has long been 
associated with peasant resistance to structural constraints, such as exploitative extrac-
tion of surpluses, arbitrary top-down policies, elite- or state-driven pressures on land and 
livelihoods, and resulting social differentiation (Scott 1985; Hart et al. 1989; Kerkvliet 
2005; Caouette and Turner 2009; Hall et al. 2015).  The exercise of agency in these forms 
is exemplified in the Southeast Asian context in Scott’s work on “moral economy” and 
everyday resistance (1976; 1985).  While moral economy is concerned with social unrest 
resulting from the undermining of subsistence arrangements and violating peasants’ 
“notion of economic justice” (Scott 1976, 3), open rebellion is an exception to the norms 
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of everyday resistance (Scott 1985)—mundane, day-to-day struggles against exploitation 
through non-adherence to rules.  The power of everyday resistance as a form of collective 
agency in response to top-down structural constraints is perhaps nowhere better depicted 
than in the widespread non-compliance that reversed Vietnam’s agricultural collec-
tivization policies in the 1970s and 1980s (Kerkvliet 2005).  Laos enacted a concurrent 
collectivization campaign in the late 1970s (see context, below), although coercion and 
the (albeit often grudging) participation of the population meant that its reversal was less 
a result of direct resistance than the urgencies of low productivity and food shortages 
(Evans 1995; High 2014).  Because of general subservience to the directives of the cen-
tralized state, and in some cases, fear (High 2014), resistance took more evasive forms 
in Laos compared to Vietnam.  These included smuggling farm output to cross-border 
markets, moving upland swidden cultivation deeper into remote mountains with less 
state control, and the mass exit of refugees across the Mekong river to Thailand (Brown 
and Zasloff 1986; Bourdet 2000).
Despite its value as an understanding of local agency in response to structural con-
straint, resistance can also be overapplied or “essentialized” into narratives which fail to 
provide a balanced reflection of people’s abilities to pursue positive outcomes from chang-
ing political and economic conditions (Forsyth 2009).  In the post-reform re-engagement 
of Laos and Vietnam with the wider Southeast Asian region during the 1990s, and rapid 
expansion of transboundary investments in commercial agriculture and natural resources 
that followed, agency remains a key consideration in how the remnants of agrarian soci-
eties navigate structural changes to maintain and seek new opportunities (Michaud and 
Forsyth 2011; Turner 2012).  Beyond everyday resistance, understanding responses to 
rural transformation can be enhanced by considering the relationship between individual 
agency and people’s perceptions of structural constraints (Drahmoune 2013), examined 
below in the context of development, market, and forest conservation interventions in 
Laos.
II-2 Agency, Development, and Sustainability
Applied understandings of agency have in many ways significantly expanded through 
recent focus in mainstream development literature on concepts of participation, inclusion, 
and empowerment, frequently in relation to human well-being.  It is a measure of the 
leeway in these terms that they are often used in combination, if not interchangeably, 
while applying diverse definitions (on agency and empowerment, see Ibrahim and Alkire 
2007).  Much work on these themes draws from Sen’s widely influential capabilities 
approach (1999), which considers the constraining effects of deficient agency on human 
well-being, through limiting the ability of people to pursue the life they value.  Several 
R. Cole et al.178
significant advancements to the capabilities approach include the proposal of internation-
ally comparable indicators for agency and empowerment (Ibrahim and Alkire 2007); 
quantitative study of the relationship between agency, dignity, and subjective well-being 
(Hojman and Miranda 2017); and of the suppressive effects of low agency (or “unfree-
dom”) on the relationship between wealth and well-being (Victor et al. 2013); with implicit 
links in each case to the central structure-agency tension between individual freedom 
and social constraint (Rigg 2007).
Although it is useful as a basis for policymaking to explore the effects on individual 
choices and well-being outcomes of constraints on agency in a comparable and system-
atized way, the meeting of subjective terms with numerical indicators is not without 
problems.  Loyal and Barnes (2001) reject the possibility of finding a robust measure of 
agency at all, while Emirbayer and Mische (1998) portray the exercise of agency as an 
internal process, by which individuals prioritize between past iteration or habit, respond-
ing to immediate contingencies, and a “projective” capacity toward future possibilities. 
Meanwhile, agency has had an increasing tendency to be operationalized in the social 
sciences as “decision-making” (Kabeer 1999), though often with limited reference to the 
intangible circumstances surrounding individual decisions, and whether these may be 
enabling or disabling.  In the context of sustainability, agency is considered a critical 
determinant of the response of individuals, households, and communities to external 
stressors, but rarely features in policy approaches which tend to remain pre disposed to 
“objective,” distributional issues relating to resources and infrastructure (Brown and 
Westaway 2011).
Efforts toward participatory governance are one approach to correcting this imbal-
ance, emphasizing the importance of diverse voices of those directly impacted by pro-
cesses of change (Leach et al. 2010).  Studying the representation of such voices in the 
context of protected area management in Indonesia, Myers and Muhajir observe that 
“people struggle to participate where governance structures ignore them by either an 
unwillingness or inability to advance community claims upward within the democratic 
structures” (2015, 379).  This is exacerbated by technocratic interventions that tend to 
compartmentalize socio-political concerns into measurable and obtainable targets, while 
multi-level governance increases the complexity of realizing the participation of stake-
holders at local level.  Myers and Muhajir argue for “securing a voice for forest users 
. . . to participate in the decisions about land over which they lay claim” (ibid.).  We now 
turn to agency in relation to forest conservation in greater detail, before exploring lived 
experiences of policies and interventions in the uplands of northern Laos.
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II-3 Agency in Forest Conservation Interventions
The extent of agency on the part of forest-dwelling communities in relation to often 
externally designed (i.e., by national and/or international organizations) policies and inter-
ventions is an open question, and highly context-dependent.  Referring to would-be 
inclusive forest management, Galvin and Haller observe that participatory approaches 
appear to have emerged as institutional means of “reconciling local people with conser-
vationists, and conservation with development,” with the underlying objective of balanc-
ing participation with protection agendas (2008, 17).  Even as community participation 
in managing local resources has become firmly embedded in mainstream development 
logics, policy support has often remained in the domain of rhetoric (Colfer and Capistrano 
2005).
At global level, indigenous alliances have on the one hand been increasingly acknowl-
edged in policy negotiations, though with less direct agency in terms of participation in 
shaping rules relating to interactions between people and forests (Schroeder 2010).  At 
the national level, Brockhaus et al. (2014b) observe that while minority coalitions have 
focused attention toward environmental justice in some countries, including participation 
of indigenous peoples in policy processes, these are rarely framed in opposition to large-
scale investments that impact forests, inadvertently reinforcing structural drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation.  Focusing at national and subnational scales in 
Vietnam, Thu et al. (in press) emphasize the gulf between actors engaged in the design 
and implementation of forest policies and swidden farmers living in forested upland areas, 
despite the latter being among the most affected, largely due to a state-led discourse that 
rejects the continuing existence of swidden cultivation, and thus blocks participation of 
farmers in policy processes.
Upland farmers in Laos have similarly faced a range of constraints set in place by 
policies in which they have minimal input, including resettlement of rural populations 
and land reclassification measures aimed at tightening control over access to forests and 
eradicating swidden cultivation (Baird and Shoemaker 2007; Hett et al. 2011; Castella 
et al. 2013).  As part of these measures, Laos’ network of national protected areas (NPAs), 
nominally covering about 14% of national territory, resulted from shifts in policy since 
the late 1980s to maintain the surviving forest resource base after prolonged heavy log-
ging (Ingalls 2017; Robichaud et al. 2001; Sirivongs and Tsuchiya 2012).  Renewed policy 
emphasis toward protecting forests and biodiversity also meshed well with the rising 
global development focus on sustainability, which came to dominate aid priorities and 
strongly influence international project funding in Laos in the 1990s (Singh 2012). 
Reliance on forest land and resources for livelihoods among marginal rural populations 
living in proximity to the NPAs make local participation integral to their effective manage-
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ment (de Koning et al. 2017; Sirivongs and Tsuchiya 2012).  To this end, while beginning 
from an expert-led and exclusionary “fortress conservation” model of forest management 
(Ingalls 2017), soon after establishing the NPAs, the Lao government set in law a par-
ticipatory approach to protected area management with the aim of involving and ben-
efitting local populations (Rao et al. 2014).  Despite the apparent meeting of interests 
between international donors and the state, Singh notes that “this interpretation is 
strongly challenged when the focus shifts from policy to practice” (2012, 40), and scien-
tific approaches to conservation have tended to be persistently viewed as a foreign aspi-
ration, concealing people’s everyday knowledge and the needs of local livelihoods.
Competing power claims inevitably underlie the enclosure of forests containing 
established communities, and local agency in Laos’ NPA system has in some cases been 
noted as more on the basis of opposition and subversion than participation (Ingalls 2017). 
Although aimed towards creating a model of “sustainable livelihood and conservation 
strategies which strongly advocates people’s involvement,” trust issues, contestation 
over resources, poor information flow to forest-dwelling communities, and unsustainable 
funding and political will have sometimes constrained ostensibly agency-enabling ideals 
(de Koning et al. 2017, 88).  While NPAs play an essential role in conserving Laos’ forests, 
they do so in a complex policy arena in which technical interventions remain driven by 
international organizations, though as is the case elsewhere, often failing to engage 
power ful economic interests that underpin unsustainable exploitation of forests (Cole 
et al. 2017a), and in which local voices may go unheard.
Referring specifically to the Nam Et Phou Louey NPA in Laos (also the study loca-
tion of the present article, see below), Martin et al. (2018) observe that despite livelihoods 
being in some cases severely curtailed by the enclosure of the forest, local communities 
nevertheless express broad support for the NPA.  The high degree of receptiveness to 
internalizing messages on NPA restrictions and intended benefits is shown in the study 
to be due to perceived historic dependence on authority, such that “rules are followed 
not because they have popular support, but simply because they are the rules and are 
backed up by hierarchical power” (Martin et al. 2018, 103).  De Koning et al. argue for 
rights-based decentralized governance as a pathway to collaborative management of pro-
tected forests in Laos, notwithstanding the needed “ongoing political will to consolidate 
and sustain these arrangements” (2017, 87).  This argument might equally apply across 
diverse forms of development intervention, and we add that such inclusive ideals should 
be understood as rooted in the enablement of agency, underpinned by the conditions of 
interactions among the actors involved, and those of engagement and exchange of infor-
mation and resources among would-be participants.
In the following sections, we consider how agency can be understood by people’s 
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lived experiences of three distinct rules-based systems of resource allocation that affect 
everyday life, as identified by respondents in two villages of Laos’ mountainous Houaphan 
province.  We defined such a “system” to comprise: i) resources and/or knowledge that 
are exchanged; ii) actors who instigate exchanges; iii) purposes for the exchange; and iv) 
social foci and tools that facilitate the exchange (in other words: what, among whom, why, 
where, and how exchanges occur).  As such, these systems can be considered analogous 
to how social structures are (re)produced through actors’ recursive actions, according to 
(or in defiance of) schemas of rules surrounding resource allocation (Sewell 1992).
While the livelihood development and poverty reduction projects and national pro-
tected area systems are policy-driven interventions, involving both national and inter-
national organizations, the maize contract farming system is primarily market-driven 
(albeit complying with state aims to commercialize the agricultural sector, and with 
limited local government involvement), and run by networks of Vietnamese and Lao 
traders.  In the context of continued reliance on swidden agriculture among a majority of 
upland farmers in the studied communities, the interaction between these systems high-
lights long-running tensions between State objectives and local realities.  As is commonly 
observed in upland areas of Southeast Asia, Laos’ rural development policies have for 
decades sought to stabilize and ultimately eradicate swidden due to its perceived destruc-
tive environmental impacts and non-adherence to State-favored, sedentary practices 
(Heinimann et al. 2013; Kenney-Lazar 2013; Scott 1998; 2009).  Moves toward intensive 
commercial agriculture such as maize contract farming are thus welcomed and indeed 
promoted by local governments as a more stable alternative to swidden (despite fre-
quently accelerating conversion of land and forests), though upland farmers often con-
tinue to cultivate swidden rice as the main food crop, whether by necessity or choice 
(Heinimann et al. 2013; Vongvisouk et al. 2016).
III Study Context, Sites, and Methods
III-1 Context
Rural development has been an unwavering focus of government rhetoric and policy since 
the founding of the Lao PDR in 1975, with consistent aims to reinforce state legitimacy 
by improving living conditions and “modernizing” livelihoods; and to extend state author-
ity over marginal rural spaces and integrate upland minorities into the mainstream 
(Évrard 2011; Singh 2012; Cole and Ingalls, forthcoming).  During the post-war period of 
“high communism,” these objectives were pursued through a collectivization campaign—
envisaged to boost agricultural output and achieve food security, while also reordering 
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peasant society under a “legible” social structure (Evans 1988).  To a large extent, these 
efforts proved ineffective, and coupled with the risk of general economic collapse brought 
on by Laos’ isolationism, led to an urgent push for reforms by the mid-1980s (the New 
Economic Mechanism), and subsequent re-engagement with the ensuing regionalization 
under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Evans 1995; Stuart-Fox 
1995; Pholsena and Banomyong 2006).  Market reforms have underpinned long-term 
policy emphasis on agricultural commercialization as a foreseen fast-track to poverty 
reduction in rural areas, alongside the widespread resettlement of remote villages closer 
to roads and district centers, albeit with widely observed negative impacts among the 
poorest sections of society (Rigg 2005; Baird and Shoemaker 2007).  ASEAN integration 
and infrastructure-building since the 1990s, in combination with the government’s 
decade-long policy on “turning land into capital,” have created inroads for large-scale 
transboundary land acquisitions, transforming land relations, and frequently increasing 
pressure on marginal land and livelihoods (Baird 2011; Ingalls et al. 2018a; Cole and 
Ingalls, forthcoming).  These same processes of integration have gradually geared 
Laos’ rural economy toward the demands of neighboring China, Vietnam, and Thailand 
(Bourdet 2000; Rigg 2005), including for bulk agricultural commodities via a prolifera-
tion of cross-border contract farming arrangements (Cole et al. 2017b), as exemplified 
below.
With Laos’ global re-engagement came the significant presence and influence 
(particularly via aid funding patterns, see Singh 2012) of the international development 
sector, and sharpening discursive focus on participatory, inclusive, and sustainable devel-
opment, environmental conservation, and more recently “green growth” (Kallio et al. 
2018).  However, the heavy emphasis of elite interests and foreign investments in land- 
and resource-intensive sectors places notions of sustainability firmly at odds with an 
economic model based on agricultural intensification and the exploitation of natural 
resources (Cole et al. 2017a; Ingalls et al. 2018b).  Epitomizing the complexity of this 
tension is the forestry sector: at once a key source of revenue for the nascent communist 
government since the late 1970s; the focus of entrenched elite interests for large-scale 
land concessions, such as plantations; and of wide-ranging donor-funded forestry initia-
tives, including the extensive national protected area network (Robichaud et al. 2001; 
Cole et al. 2017a; Cole and Ingalls, forthcoming).  Similar tensions are observed in other 
sectors that loom large in the sustainability agenda in Laos, notably water resources 
management, and are commonly framed as “trade-offs” between conserving the environ-
ment and rural livelihoods on the one hand, and harnessing resources for national devel-
opment on the other (Friend and Blake 2009; Wong 2010).  The level of local participation 
in such decisions may often be questionable, highlighting the fragility of terms such as 
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inclusive or participatory development, and the importance of understanding the varying 
extents to which plans made from afar may enable or disable agency among the people 
most directly affected.
III-2 Sites
The analysis that follows is based on data collected in 2013 in two villages of Xone district, 
Houaphan province, northern Laos (Fig. 1), anonymized as village A) and village B).  The 
sites were selected on the basis of swidden cultivation being the dominant land-use 
system; the presence of significant forest cover; and the presence of factors affecting land 
access and the maintenance of forest cover—in this case, proximity to protected forest. 
Xone and the neighboring district of Hiem2) collectively cover more than 3,750 km2, 
approximately 70% of which is enclosed by the Nam Et Phou Louey National Protected 
Area (NEPL-NPA).  Established in 1993 as part of the above-mentioned land reclassifica-
tion and expansion of the NPA system, NEPL-NPA covers an area of 422,900 ha spanning 
Fig. 1 Map of Study Sites, Xone District, Houaphan Province, Lao PDR
2) Shortly after the completion of fieldwork in 2014, the former district of Viengthong, containing the 
two study sites, was divided into two the new districts of Xone and Hiem.  For this reason, some 
of the district-level data used here from the period of the research covers both the new districts.
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three provinces, of which the majority area is located in Houaphan.  NEPL-NPA has been 
under active management since 2000, aimed at protecting forest and endangered wildlife, 
and promoting sustainable land-use via regulations endorsed at provincial and district 
levels in 2008 (Hett et al. 2011).  While NEPL-NPA has a significant role in provincial-
level forest governance in Houaphan, it has nevertheless been encroached by commercial 
maize cultivation since the rapid uptake of the crop by farmers in the 2000s (Vongvisouk 
et al. 2016).  Agriculture is the main livelihood, commonly a combination of paddy and 
swidden rice, vegetable gardening, and maize, the main locally-produced commodity 
crop,3) for which Xone district serves as a collection point for several Vietnamese- and 
Lao-operated businesses.  Cultivation of maize expanded dramatically around 2010, when 
high demand in Vietnam fostered promotion of the crop by district authorities to support 
rural income improvement, while simultaneously encouraging traders and collectors to 
engage with farmers in Laos.  In village A), maize was commonly grown on the available 
sloping land surrounding the village, in combination with a range of other livelihood 
activities including livestock and non-farm work in the neighboring peri-urban district 
economy.  Although more remote than village A), village B) is also more self-contained, 
with a large area of paddy land and overall territory of 20,000 ha, including swidden fields 
mostly turned over to maize at the time of the research.  Table 1 summarizes basic 
characteristics of the two sites.4)
III-3 Methods
Focus group discussions differentiated by gender and age were undertaken at each village 
3) Unpublished district data, Viengthong District Agriculture and Forestry Office, 2013.
4) Focus group discussions, field notes, 2013
Table 1 Characteristics of Study Sites

























5 hours 2.5 hours
Source: Focus group discussions, 2013.
Note: * Travel times by unpaved road at the time of research, which may be reduced on completion of a new 
road (under construction at the time of writing) linking village B) both to the nearest major domestic 
road and directly to the Vietnamese border.
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during May 2013.  These activities first aimed to gain detailed accounts of historical 
structural conditions of resource allocation, particularly relating to land, along with gen-
eral environmental, economic, and social characteristics at the two sites.  Second, the 
discussions were designed to distinguish and prioritize social structures that dominated 
village life in the eyes of respondents, represented by the systems described above, 
comprising livelihood development and poverty reduction projects, maize contract farm-
ing, and NEPL-NPA.  The three systems and networks of actors involved were then 
further explored in household surveys conducted from September to December 2013, 
with 40 randomly selected household heads per village.  Resulting qualitative data were 
analyzed by focusing on patterns of participation in decision-making processes and result-
ing actions, the nature of interactions between actors and ability to influence decisions 
within the three systems, aspects of dependency and circumstances of non-participation. 
We do not claim that this approach offers a fixed measure of agency, though we argue 
that the value in applying a structure-agency lens lies in considering ways that agency 
might be enabled or disabled by structural conditions, which in the context of this study 
can be linked to respondents’ ability to engage in and shape decisions and interventions 
that affect them.
IV Results
IV-1 Historical Structural Conditions of Resource Allocation
Differing historical trajectories in the two villages offer insights into the structural condi-
tions of resource allocation, particularly in terms of differentiated access to land, and the 
influence of this on local livelihoods.  Village A) was established through the resettlement 
of several remote Hmong hamlets since the late 1990s to land adjacent with present-day 
Xone district, in line with long-running government policy to relocate isolated ethnic 
minority communities in the uplands closer to roads and state services (Évrard and 
Goudineau 2004; Évrard and Baird 2017).  The initial resettlement comprised 37 house-
holds, and more than 100 further households had since relocated there by 2013.  Though 
an integral policy objective of village resettlement has been to contribute to the stabi-
lization of swidden cultivation in the uplands (Baird and Shoemaker 2007), resettled 
populations must also navigate existing (formal and informal) land allocation regimes in 
the new location (Lestrelin and Giordano 2007).  This process is differentiated not only 
between resettled and existing populations, but among the social strata of the resettled 
group, and among earlier and later arrivals.  In village A), irrigated paddy land was allo-
cated only to initial settlers, who were also commonly assigned various official roles, 
R. Cole et al.186
thereby gaining positions of enhanced agency in local-level decisions.  While the initial 
settlers and those following shortly thereafter were also able to access additional agri-
cultural plots reallocated from neighboring villages, later arrivals received land only for 
housing construction.  The allocation of land in village A) is thus observably embedded 
in a historically bound schema of rules, derived from a combination of government reset-
tlement policies, local regimes of land allocation, and stratified social relations at different 
stages of resettlement.
Many households maintained former swiddens and sanam (secondary villages close 
to rice fields, built to accommodate peak labor requirements in the agricultural cycle) in 
the areas they previously farmed before resettlement.  These were continuously occupied 
to some degree, sometimes for two to three months at a time by a varying number of 
individuals based on the size of household, and thus mobility between the village and the 
sanam was virtually constant.  Villagers accessed sanam lands at different locations and 
distances from the new village, the furthest being more than 20 km away along mountain 
tracks.  The need to retain distant former lands might on the one hand be viewed as 
demonstrating minimal agency in the face of constraints that the households had no 
control over—in this case barring some (especially late-comers) from accessing land in 
the new village.  On the other hand, the act of sustaining a livelihood in a location far from 
the reach of local authorities, and in doing so operating on one’s own terms, might also 
be viewed as a form of agency through passive dissent.  Those cultivating the sanam 
swiddens continued to primarily grow rice as opposed to maize, since this was considered 
more practical for storage and transporting to market while providing a secure supply of 
food.  Living in the remote sanam also entailed isolation from services and wider eco-
nomic opportunities however, and thus “agency” in this case should be considered as 
actions within a severely limited field of options.
Village B) is the more established of the two sites, existing since the late nineteenth 
century.  In accordance with the collectivization campaign set in place nationwide in 
the late 1970s (Evans 1988; Castella and Bouahom 2014), village B) was instructed to 
reorganize as a production cooperative.  This entailed a reorientation from the former 
traditional mode of land allocation within the community (on a five-year basis according 
to household size), to the communal contribution of labor, and allocation of output among 
all households based on the labor invested.  The cooperative model remained in place in 
the village until 1987 with the shift in national policy toward market-orientation, and 
despite the collectivization policy having been officially cancelled several years earlier 
due to general ineffectiveness (Evans 1995).
One direct local outcome of this transition was that all former privately owned paddy 
lands collectivized during the 1980s were returned to the previous owners.  While those 
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who had not previously owned land were largely excluded by this process, some of the 
paddy area that had been expanded through collective efforts during the cooperative 
period was assigned as communal, and referred to as “village land.”  Half of the collec-
tively expanded paddy was initially reallocated among individual households and the rest 
held communally, eventually reducing to one-third in 2004.  This land remained com-
munal at the time of the research, though there were plans for further reallocation accord-
ing to household size.  The differing trajectories of the two villages, and resulting schemas 
of rules surrounding the distribution of agricultural land, underline ways that marginal 
upland communities in Laos have historically been subjected to shifts in policies in which 
they have minimal control, but which often carry dramatic and long-term impacts.  As 
development policies and interventions designed at both international and national levels 
have increasingly emphasized participation and inclusion, whether this is subsequently 
reflected by greater enablement of agency among local populations remains a source of 
ambiguity.
IV-2 Participation in Resource Allocation Systems
Table 2 shows the share of respondents in the two villages reporting participation in the 
three systems of resource allocation.  Our analysis further differentiates whether their 
self-described participation was confined to attending village meetings, implying presence 
during related decisions and receipt and/or exchange of information, or also included 
providing labor for specific system-related activities, implying more active engagement. 
The highest proportions of participation for both villages were in livelihood development 
and poverty reduction projects and maize contract farming.  The maize system universally 
entailed both attending village meetings and labor (i.e., cultivating maize) among all who 
Table 2 System Participation by Village
Village Resource  Allocation System
Participation Type of  Participation
Yes No Meetings Only Meetings plus Labor/Activity
A) Livelihood development and 
poverty reduction projects
39 1 27 12
Maize contract farming 33 7 0 33
NEPL-NPA 27 13 23 4
B) Livelihood development and 
poverty reduction projects
28 12 4 14
Maize contract farming 38 2 0 38
NEPL-NPA 16 24 9 7
Source: Household surveys.
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described themselves as participants.  Responses were more mixed for livelihood devel-
opment and poverty reduction projects, with a greater overall share of participation in 
village A), perhaps reflecting its proximity to the district seat of power, though participa-
tion was more active in terms of labor in the more remote village B).  Participation in the 
protected area system was lower in both villages, particularly village B) which is located 
deepest within the boundaries of NEPL-NPA (see Fig. 1), and mostly entailed attending 
meetings only.
Respondents who described themselves as participants had varying knowledge of 
and interactions with the networks of actors involved in the three systems, in turn imply-
ing different levels of knowledge of how the systems function, and the distribution of 
responsibilities within them.  Respondents who stated knowing one actor (or actor 
category, e.g. “district staff,” “foreign experts” or simply “the government”) tended to 
be the largest group, while those listing second and third actors tended to be respectively 
fewer.  Respondents who personally knew actors referred in the majority of instances to 
maize traders or members of the village committee.  The most commonly named actors 
were the village heads, who in turn were often the only residents of the two villages who 
stated that they personally knew local officials, demonstrating both their intersecting role 
in the functions of each of the three systems, and as gatekeepers to official information.
IV-3 Livelihood Development and Poverty Reduction Projects
Almost all respondents in both villages reported regular visits by staff of projects, one 
village A) respondent commenting that “they’re always coming here” [A4].  In village 
B), most respondents referred to each project by its purpose, such as “livestock project,” 
“poultry project,” or “assistance,” though source organizations were often conflated 
(e.g. a visit by a German development agency was described by one respondent as an 
“aid project of America” [B27]).  The most commonly named project activities in both 
locations were those relating to the Poverty Reduction Fund (PRF),5) understood by many 
respondents to be behind most village-level development activities, particularly con-
struction of hard infrastructure such as local water supplies, clinics, and schools.  Some 
respondents had contributed labor to the construction of these facilities, which in village 
B) included irrigation for paddy fields allocated to resettled villagers.  Altruistic views of 
the visits by officials connected to the PRF were quite common among respondents, that 
“they develop the rural areas” [B7]; “they came here to develop our village” [B8]; and 
“to solve the poverty of the people” [B35].  Another village B) respondent elaborated on 
5) The PRF is a grassroots development project, in which participating villages select from priority 
investment activities in terms of infrastructure and training, partially paid for by donor funding 
channeled through the project and managed and implemented by villagers (GoL 2003).
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the rationale behind the PRF: “they want us to be happy and have a comfortable living 
. . . they just want us to make money” [B26].  In village A), perceived purposes of project 
visits tended to be more general, often referring to improving living conditions, some 
linking this to policy and geographical disparities, “because people in the highlands do 
not gain enough from government policy goals” [A28].  Others associated project visits 
with announcements and the promotion of various aims, including planting commercial 
crops, and the more idealistic “village solidarity” and “self-development.”
The village head was considered a focal point in both locations, convening meetings, 
channeling information to the village, mobilizing labor for projects, and explaining local 
needs to project staff, thereby exerting influence over outcomes at the village level. 
Specifically for the PRF, the village head was also considered responsible for gathering 
the opinions and concerns of villagers and appealing to the government to support devel-
opment needs, for which funding and construction may then be considered.  Village A) 
respondents were least aware of specific actors relating to livelihood development and 
poverty reduction projects, commonly depicted as unnamed external officials visiting the 
village head, who sought agreement with the “relevant organizations,” after which the 
“officials called on the village and assembled the villagers for development” [A16].  The 
procedures of working with projects were reflected on in more detail by the village head, 
which for the PRF would begin with a visit by an extension officer to survey the condition 
of the village, after which the village committee would send a written request for assis-
tance to the “agriculture office,” which then “sent the project to help the village” [A35].
Respondents in village B) considered district officials to be responsible for announc-
ing PRF projects, promoting agriculture, and being a source of funding and occasional 
rice donations, while provincial officials were considered responsible for gathering and 
announcing information.  District government staff were perceived as the most influen-
tial actors in the delivery of development interventions to village B), and described by 
some respondents to be acting out of concern for local living conditions, providing guid-
ance over how to improve the village, including construction of PRF infrastructure.  Other 
respondents connected the work of district officials in the village to broader national 
development and poverty reduction narratives, “because now the society is more con-
venient than before, and to help villagers develop to improve [their] life” [B24] and “avoid 
being out of date” [B32].  Some focused more strongly on this modernization role, 
describing the efforts of the district as helping “villagers to make their lives more like in 
the town, with electricity, water supply” and birth control [B9]; as well as to “upgrade 
their living to be better than the old system, and give them the new system to bring 
income to the family” [B40], based on livestock raising and cash crops.
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IV-4 Maize Contract Farming
Perhaps representative of this perceived “new system,” most respondents in both vil-
lages had actively participated in maize contract farming for about two to three years at 
the time of the research.  Vietnamese traders and companies were considered to hold 
greatest influence over the maize system in village B), having initiated production of the 
crop in the village, though some respondents were only aware of “businessmen” of both 
Lao and Vietnamese origin.  The diverse perceptions of importance of business actors 
included showing villagers how to produce maize, offering contracts, seed loans, and other 
credit, and collecting and transporting the harvest (including cutting feeder roads to 
hard-to-reach hillsides).  Some respondents explained that the companies directly 
approached the village leaders to invite them to encourage villagers to engage in maize 
contracts.  Others considered that district officials had played the most prominent role 
in promoting commercial maize production and authorizing maize companies to operate. 
In both villages, the village head continued to hold significant influence in the maize 
system for many respondents, introducing the companies to the village, acting as the 
facilitator of contracts, arranging meetings, and keeping records.  The village A) head’s 
role extended to managing the engagement of different households in contracts and 
distribution of seeds supplied on credit by the company, and in some cases, guiding 
 villagers on maize production, based on knowledge gained from the village cluster (sub-
district) or other villages.
Of the more than three-quarters of respondents in village A) who grew maize, a 
majority were directly acquainted with business actors that introduced the contract farm-
ing system to the village.  Varying accounts were given of how this process occurred, 
involving combinations of Vietnamese, Lao, and local Hmong actors, with kinship net-
works seemingly playing a prominent role.  Many respondents considered that the Viet-
namese company first cooperated with the district authority over the buying price, after 
which the district allowed the company to operate, local authorities encouraging people 
to “turn to new jobs to make progress, and stand on your own two feet” [A12].  Some 
even alluded to a kind of moral philanthropy on the part of the business actors, who would 
highlight the deficiencies of “people’s living in the past, when they only cut trees and 
destroyed forest.  We cleared forest for shifting cultivation for many generations, but we 
never achieved prosperity” [A5], arguing the case for commercial crops as a solution, 
which the company would buy “to reduce poverty” [A18].  Others reported that the 
district and company organized a village meeting to “announce information about plans 
for growing maize to transform people’s livelihoods” [A13].  In these cases, the company 
would be considered of greatest importance: “these businessmen arranged everything” 
[A5], lending seeds and purchasing the product, as well as ploughing fields and cutting 
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feeder roads based on the contract terms with producers.  Lack of land and labor were 
barriers for the few respondents who did not grow maize.
IV-5 Nam Et Phou Louey National Protected Area
Most respondents’ experiences of NEPL-NPA related to announcements and meetings 
delivered by district or project staff, with the village head often the point of contact, who 
would then inform villagers of conservation restrictions, as well as penalties of failing to 
observe them.  Few respondents were able to name specific project actors in the NPA 
system, and those of influence were otherwise generalized in both villages as project 
and/or district staff.  Few respondents listed a second actor beyond the village head. 
Provincial and district staff were considered important in translating policy, in that they 
“come to the village to announce what the government announces, especially about the 
rules and principles” [A8], initially training and informing the village leaders on “advan-
tages and disadvantages of forests in the past, present and future” [A6].  Respondents 
also referred to visits by a survey team of district staff to identify and announce where 
the NPA borders affect village land, “so that [villagers] don’t go to destroy” the forest 
[A6].  Such visits would include providing information on using forests sustainably, 
occasionally delivered by “foreign experts,” but in some cases also village elders.  The 
experience of NPA visits seemed less constructive in village B), the head expressing 
frustration that NPA staff “just say they will come to help people like this, like that, but 
that project is not good, they just come to advertise, such as pictures of hunting animals” 
[B36].  Most respondents identified the role of the village head with calling meetings to 
announce the NPA borders and banned activities such as wildlife hunting and forest 
clearance, cooperating with the provincial and district staff and following up enactment 
of regulations.  Perhaps again reflecting closer proximity to the district center, the village 
A) head was directly acquainted with senior staff of the NPA and described their role as 
demarcating accessible land, explaining its sustainable use and rules to restrict activities 
that impact forests and wildlife.
About one-third of respondents in both villages had some knowledge of further 
planned forest or conservation related projects.  Descriptions in village B) included 
awareness of climate change projects gained from forest conservation staff, and announce-
ments relating to NEPL-NPA and the ongoing drive to eradicate swidden cultivation. 
Respondents in village A) referred to forest-related projects, including those associated 
with NEPL-NPA, information campaigns on forest conservation led by the district author-
ities, and related visits from foreign experts.  Most respondents expressed interest to 
participate in forest conservation, whether to fulfil government plans and prescribed 
obligations, or responding to the need to protect local resources.  Other motivations 
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ranged between the more passive stances observed in relation to the other systems 
(e.g. “I will wait for the head of the village to announce the relevant information” [B15]; 
“I’ll do, if they want me to do” [B22]), to concerns over missing out on opportunities for 
material or informational advantage (“If the project has benefits to the villagers, I also 
want to join” [B16]; “If they tell us I want to attend, I need to know what they talk about” 
[B30]).  For others, desire to participate was more pragmatic, some expressing the wish 
to do so only if “convenient.”  When asked how they considered they might contribute 
to implementation, responses again varied between passive recipience and following 
changes in laws and regulations (“we will do what they order” [A2]; “I will follow the plan 
the government announces” [B30]); to desiring an active role and being a model for other 
households.  Of the more active responses, some directly referred to learning how to 
protect the forest, contributing labor and equipment if they possess it, and planting trees, 
while one respondent asserted that “the villager must be in a strong role in this program” 
[B27].  The few respondents who were not interested either believed forest-related 
projects to be the responsibility of the village head, or otherwise considered themselves 
ill-equipped in terms of knowledge, too old, or facing too many difficulties of their own 
to engage in such things.  Table 3 summarizes the results by the three systems of 
resource allocation.
V Discussion: Local Agency in Systems of Resource Allocation
Part of what it means to conceive of human beings as agents is to conceive of them as empowered 
by access to resources of one kind or another. (Sewell 1992, 10, original emphasis)
The previous section examined the historical-structural conditions of resource allocation 
within the study villages, and patterns and experiences of participation in the three 
resource allocation systems of livelihood development and poverty reduction projects, 
maize contract farming, and the NEPL-NPA.  Respondents’ interactions with each system 
are governed by its respective institutional structure and resulting allocation of different 
kinds of resources—varying forms of development assistance through the projects 
system; production inputs and income through the maize system; and information and 
the maintenance of forest resources through the NPA.  The further aim of adopting a 
structure-agency lens is to examine the ways that these structures may “limit, constrain 
or enable human action” (Rigg 2007, 27), by contrasting their agency-enabling features 
that may allow people to influence the decisions that affect them with aspects of depend-
ence and circumstances of non-participation.
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Within the poverty reduction and livelihood development projects system, the 
bottom-up, consultative aspect of the PRF is perhaps most strongly resonant with the 
enablement of agency, through influence to some degree over what activities are under-
taken and how, and hence the allocation of resources.  This is because the PRF is 
ostensibly designed to allow autonomous proposals of local needs by villagers for higher 
authorities to consider and respond to with funding, thereby presenting a form of vertical 
communication with decision-makers that is otherwise rare within existing governance 
hierarchies.  Respondents at both sites referred to the village head appealing to the 
government for assistance in this way, and expressions of agency on the part of house-
holds might thus be viewed as being channeled via the local leaders.  However, it should 
be noted that participating villages in the PRF select options from an externally pre-
defined project “menu,” based on agreement between the government and the World 
Bank (GoL 2003), and the rules of resource allocation are thus to some extent remotely 
set within the project structure.  This is confirmed in some aspects in village A), where 
respondents viewed district or project staff as disconnected from local reality, in that they 
could “only make the plan” from afar [A2].  Other village A) respondents considered 
“villagers” to be key actors in the first system, since it is they who undertake all activities 
in the village, though still considering themselves less influential overall than govern-
ment staff or village leaders.  Several respondents referred to a further expression of 
agency in the form of avoidance, by opting out of activities and meetings when other 
needs take precedence, particularly during peak labor periods when it was necessary to 
stay in the fields.  Despite the apparently community-driven approach of the PRF, a sense 
of dependence on external actors as gatekeepers to project resources prevailed, reflected 
in statements such as “if there is not this project, our village would be poorer than now” 
[B17] and “we will not have this project if there is no one like [district official]” [B24]. 
In village A), the role of the head was considered paramount: “if we don’t have the head 
of the village [the project] is impossible” [A11].  Villagers who held the perception of 
being unable to participate whatsoever in such projects considered themselves barred 
by circumstance, one respondent stating that the household could not join “because I am 
just a regular villager and go to listen to them only . . . we are very poor and we don’t 
have anything to provide them” [B2].  These statements highlight the impact of localized 
structural conditions over the enablement versus disablement of respondents to influence 
the interventions that affect them, through the sense of self-reinforcing circumstances 
of poverty, and of prevailing dependence on institutional hierarchy, as similarly observed 
by Martin et al. (2018).
As a market-based structure, the clearest expression of agency within the maize 
contract system is through the business decisions that households are, on the surface, 
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free to make—that is, whether to grow the crop or not, and if so for whom.  However, 
the fact that most farmers enter contracts under credit conditions (typically for start-up 
capital, seasonal inputs, and construction of feeder roads by traders) means that apparent 
degrees of autonomy on the part of contract farmers may often quickly lead to conditions 
of dependency.  This is consistent with research elsewhere in Houaphan province, which 
reveals how farmers are “often locked in relationships that they did not even choose” 
with traders, later becoming ensnared in a cycle of increasing inputs to compensate for 
degrading land, with farmers struggling to repay production costs and loans (Vagneron 
and Kousonsavath 2015, 6–10).  A further layer of this dependency was evident in the 
importance attached to external actors in connecting farmers to the Vietnamese market: 
“Vietnamese businessmen started this project and come to buy, so this is the most sig-
nificant encouragement to grow more maize” [A9].  With this said, most participants were 
directly aware of different local traders, and there was evidence in both villages of switch-
ing to new contracts where others had proven untrustworthy (particularly by reneging 
on agreed prices).  While almost all households were active participants in the system, 
some had nonetheless decided to opt out, one farmer stating that “I don’t connect with 
the maize project, and they don’t know about me either” [B14].  As with the PRF, the 
role of local institutional structures was evidenced by perceptions of the village head’s 
importance, and the dependency within this relationship: “if the village head allows, 
we can do, if he doesn’t want us to do we won’t, if we don’t listen to him, if something 
happens he won’t be responsible for us” [B33].  Village A) respondents generally con-
sidered this in a more enabling light, that the village head “leads the people to change 
their occupation, to make progress to help themselves” [A9].  Agency could be seen as 
enabled in various ways through the maize contract system, particularly improving 
income and living standards, though as has proven the case elsewhere in Houaphan 
province at the time (Martin et al. 2018), the benefits were short-lived, while the impacts 
on the land were a source of concern for most respondents.  In a broader sense, the 
historically bound nature of land regimes in both villages acted as a filter through which 
differentiated access to land for cultivation resulted in uneven economic outcomes among 
farmers.  Agency-enabling aspects of maize production should therefore be carefully 
considered against a backdrop of economic precarity, with contracting rules governed by 
external actors, and geographical constraints over market access.
As the more top-down and restrictive of the three systems, for many respondents, 
participation in NEPL-NPA mostly involved attending meetings and following instruc-
tions, echoing the findings of Martin et al., who observed “consistent evidence that the 
district government came to inform, rather than to engage in discussion about the forma-
tion of the NPA” (ibid., 99).  Perceptions ranged from having a personal stake (“we have 
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to take care of the forest surrounding our village” [B11]), to simple obligation (“I have 
to do whatever they said” [B9]).  Participation in NPA activities was described by one 
respondent as follows: “agriculturalists and foreigners come to our village for inspecting, 
to survey the area that they want and the head of the village informed the villagers by 
telling them to go and survey with them” [B12].  While the emphasis among these state-
ments is firmly on households acting in accordance with institutional structures, as 
opposed to having a role in shaping policies that affect them, some respondents also 
considered villagers as influential actors in organizing and undertaking activities.  Others 
presented the NPA staff in a more enabling light as “teaching” villagers the advantages 
and benefits of maintaining the forest; albeit often at the same time as advising, announc-
ing, or “warning” people to protect it: “they come to control the protected area of the 
village” [B30].  As with the other two systems, the village head was once again the focal 
actor for many respondents, typified by statements that “I just know [about the NPA] by 
the head of the village” [B24].  For some, NEPL-NPA appeared to transcend any poten-
tial for individual involvement or influence, existing beyond “our responsibility, they just 
come here to advise and work with the village [leaders]” [B3], who would then counsel 
them to “accept the rules of protected forest.  Those who don’t follow the rules will be 
fined and done with according to the government strategy” [A5].  As with the other 
systems, some ability to opt out of the NPA was suggested by those who considered 
themselves too busy tending crops to join activities or meetings.  While forest communi-
ties in Laos have been observed to dispute state-sponsored enclosure of resources 
(Ingalls 2017) and elsewhere to reject participation in and benefits from government 
forest management activities to avoid legitimizing them (e.g. Myers and Muhajir 2015), 
it is perhaps a stretch to consider opting out in the studied case as such an exercise of 
agency, since this may often be a matter of simple pragmatism.  Finally, although age and 
lack of education or ability to understand the project were stated as common barriers to 
participation in the NPA system, the same respondents stated that they already knew 
how to protect the forest.  This points to separation between knowledge of the NPA as 
a project, perceived as out of the hands of respondents; and unspoken knowledge of the 
need to protect forest, that respondents may enact via everyday agency as a matter of 
course.
VI Conclusion
This article has applied a structure-agency lens to examine the experiences of marginal 
farm households in the northern Laos uplands of three distinct systems of resource 
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allocation, the degree to which farmers may shape their engagement with the different 
systems, and how agency may be enabled or disabled by this engagement.  This was 
explored via examining participation in and perceptions of decision processes and result-
ing actions, the nature of interactions between actors and ability to influence decisions 
within the three systems, and aspects of dependence and circumstances of non- 
participation.  Our analytical approach has sought a nuanced understanding of people’s 
lived experiences of such interventions, thereby the everyday enablement or disablement 
of agency, with the aim of supporting policy that is better grounded in local realities while 
contributing to debates on participatory and inclusive development in the social sciences. 
The systems identified by respondents comprised livelihood development and poverty 
reduction projects, maize contract farming, and a national protected area, each reflecting 
in different ways how the influence and practices of different sets of actors are steered 
by deeply embedded structures (Leach et al., 2010).
In his influential structuration theory, Giddens depicts a “dialectic of control” 
through which “all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who are 
subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors” (1984, 16).  The extent and 
nature of such resources offered through the studied systems is governed by local 
 hierarchies and, in the case of the maize system, geographical isolation and economic 
constraint.  Critically, in these examples of everyday experiences of development and 
environmental policies, it appears to remain firmly the norm that knowledge production 
and influence over highly impactful policy decisions remain in the ambit of external actors 
and experts (Simmons 2007), and restricted from incorporating local knowledge and 
practices by the nature of institutional structures and procedures.  It is difficult to view 
the mode of delivery of information on forest management and conservation at the time 
of the research as one that might foster local agency, and by extension, an inclusive model 
(though some respondents viewed the flow of information more positively than others), 
and existing local conservation knowledge and practices are thus at risk of being over-
looked.  On the other hand, the vocal desire among some respondents for a stronger local 
role in forest conservation is indicative that alternative approaches are possible, given 
enabling structural conditions.  These conditions would first need to include varied plat-
forms to capture the diversity of local voices in adapting, contributing to, or opposing 
interventions.  In parallel, stronger recognition of the existing exercise of local agency 
in everyday livelihood practices, together with the removal of agency-disabling barriers, 
would allow for more direct involvement by marginal forest communities in policy pro-
cesses.
The findings of this study contribute to a wider body of work on experiences of 
development in Southeast Asia by focusing on the nuances of agency and perceptions of 
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participation and inclusion in decision processes relating to resource allocation in upland 
Laos.  These perceptions, as expressed by respondents in remote upland communities, 
reflect both the structural and cultural constraints of institutional hierarchy and a willing 
dependence on external “patrons” in exchange for resources.  Li (2001) argues that there 
are definite tracks of power in rural landscapes and livelihoods laid by previous laws, 
policies, and development interventions, such as in the rules of resource allocation and 
access to land we have described in the two study villages.  Do the interventions we have 
examined, with the varied dependencies and differentiated enablement of agency they 
foster, reduce or reinforce forms of agrarian differentiation and inequality?  Although our 
study provides only a starting point for such questions, we consider that a more nuanced 
sense of agency is critical for the design of inclusive and equitable policies, which can be 
developed through understanding people’s everyday experiences of the interventions 
that affect them.
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